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Abstract 
Models of consensus are used to manage multiple 
agent systems in order to choose between different 
recommendations provided by the system. It is 
assumed that there is a central agent that solicits 
recommendations or plans from other agents. That 
agent then determines the consensus of the other 
agents, and chooses the resultant consensus recom­
mendation or plan. Voting schemes such as this 
have been used in a variety of domains, including 
air traffic control. 
This paper uses an analytic model to study the use 
of consensus in multiple agent systems. The 
binomial model is used to study the probability that 
the consensus judgment is correct or incorrect. That 
basic model is extended to account for both 
different levels of agent competence and unequal 
prior odds. The analysis of that model is critical in 
the investigation of multiple agent systems, since 
the model leads us to conclude that in some cases 
consensus judgment is not appropriate. In addition, 
the results allow us to determine how many agents 
should be used to develop consensus decisions, 
which agents should be used to develop consensus 
decisions and under which conditions the consensus 
model should be used. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A primary concern of multiple agent systems is the 
co-ordination of behavior among a collection of intelligent 
a�ents. Those agents may have different knowledge, 
different information, different information sources or all 
three. The agents may be different algorithms or use 
different solution processes. As a result, their recommen­
dations or solutions may differ, creating a management 
task of choosing between potentially conflicting solut ions. 
This paper considers those systems where there is task 
centralization. In one version of such systems, there are 
a set of agents that all solve the same problem. Then 
another agent is charged with soliciting recommendations 
or plans from each of the other agents and determining the 
consensus solution. Thus, the solution must be voted on or 
chosen from those proposed by the agents. For example, 
in some mission critical situations, three computer systems 
are each used to solve the same problem. At some point 
the three solutions are examined and compared, and the 
solution that appears in two or more of the three systems 
is chosen as the correct solution. This is the so-called 
"majority votes" or consensus situation. 
Voting schemes have been used in the development of 
multiple agent systems. For example, in a series of papers 
on air traffic control (e.g., Steeb et al. 1981, McArthur et 
al. 1982 and Cammarata et al. 1983), voting-based 
schemes were used to control interacting independent 
agents using task centralization. 
The focus of this· paper is that of determining under what 
conditions consensus is likely to generate the correct 
decision. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to develop 
and explore analytic models of consensus in order to (a) 
study conditions under which consensus is a reasonable 
basis of resolving conflicting decisions, (b) to structure the 
use of consensus as a multiple agent management tool in 
information systems. In so doing, this paper provides 
theoretic fmmdations of consensus, and a basis for the use 
of consensus in multiple agent systems. In so doing, this 
paper provides theoretic foundations for the use of 
consensus, and a basis for the use of consensus in multiple 
agent systems. 
1.1 CONSENSUS AS A BASIS OF COMPARISON 
Generally, a lack of consensus among a group of agents 
implies that some:} of the agents are not correct. However, 
even complete agreement does not guarantee correctness. 
Thus, Einhorn (1974) argued that consensus is a neces­
sary, but not sufficient condition for correctness of agent 
judgment. 
Unfortunately, there is little evidence on the relationship 
between consensus and correctness. Empirically, 
researchers have found that individual experts in some 
domains have been correct only 45 to 85% of the time 
(e.g., Libby 1976). As noted by Johnson (1988), experts 
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have problems in those domains where there is an 
uncertain relationship between inputs and outputs, 
commonly referred to as those situations where there is 
decision under uncertainty. In those domains, consensus 
generally is found to provide a good solution. For 
example, Libby (1976) found that the consensus judgment 
was correct more often than 42 out of 43 different 
individuals. Thus, there is interest in determining some of 
the characteristics of consensus, e.g., under what condi­
tions should we expect the probability of consensus to be 
greater than a non consensus decision. 
Previous researchers (e.g., Cammarata et al. 1983, p. 770) 
have argued that "Potentially, a group of agents should be 
able to solve problems more effectively than the same 
agents working individually. In practice, however, groups 
often work ineffectively and their joint productivity is less 
than the sum of the productivities expected of each 
member." This suggests that in some cases, approaches, 
such as consensus, do not work as well as might be 
anticipated, a priori. As a result, this paper is concerned 
with the determination of such situations, in order to guide 
system development. 
1.2 THIS PAPER 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a 
basic model of the correctness of consensus judgments. 
That section summarizes some classic research as applied 
to the consensus problem. Section 3 investigates some 
extensions of 1hat model, by relaxing assumptions inherent 
in that model. Some of the results of section 3 are new, 
such as the conditions for use of consensus in the situation 
of unequal prior odds. Section 4 reviews some of the 
implications of these models and briefly discusses issues 
in their implementation. Section 5 provides a brief 
summary and some extensions. 
2 A CONSTANT PROBABILITY MODEL 
Througho ut this paper, it is assumed that there is a single 
coordinating agent that is ultimately concerned with 
dichotomous decisions or recommendations. That agent 
polls the other individual agents in order to choose 
between two alternatives over a series of decision 
situations. For example, the system may be asked to 
decide whether loan applicants will default or not default, 
or, should a plane land or not land, at this time. The 
coordinating agent is responsible for choosing the 
consensus situation, feeding that solution back to the 
agents and possibly acting on the plan (e.g., Cammarata et 
al. 1983). 
The multiple agent system is assumed to employ one 
coordinating agent. In addition there are n other agents, 
each with an equal probability of being correct. Since 
consensus is the concern in this paper, those n agents are 
the focus of the remainder of the paper. It is assumed that 
the probability of success is constant for each problem and 
that the agents are assumed to arrive at their decisions 
independently. The agents' decisions are then summarized 
to determine the consensus judgment. 
2.1 BACKGROUND 
Condorcet (1785) frrst recognized that Bernoulli's (1713) 
work on the binomial could be used to model the 
probability of reaching correct decisions under different 
voting systems. Condorcet's (1785) work become the 
basis of modem research in voting (e.g., Black 1958) and 
jury decision making (Gorfman and Owen 1986). One of 
the common themes of that research is to determine the 
probability that the consensus position is correct. 
The binomial consists of n independent trials, where each 
dichotomous choice decision (referred to as the frrst and 
second alternatives), has a probability p of success and a 
probability (1-p) of failure. In a multiple agent setting, 
the use of the binomial would assume that each of the 
agent swould have equal competence. In addition, it 
would also be assumed that each of the two alternatives 
were equally likely to be correct. This assumption of 
equal prior odds- creates a special case of the binomial, 
analogous to the case of using a fair coin. Both of these 
assumptions will be relaxed later in the paper. 
2.2 A MODEL OF THE CONSENSUS­
CORRECTNESS RELATIONSHIP 
Let n be the number of agents. Let M be the minimum 
number of agents necessary to establish a majority. When 
n is odd, M=(n+1)/2, when n is even M=(n/2)+1. Let m 
be the number of agents for a given consensus, where 
m = M, ... , n. Let Pc be the probability of consensus. 
Given the two assumptions from the previous section, 
A set of binomial table values for P c for some values of 
p and n is given in Table 1. 
2.3 SOME RESULTS FROM THE MODEL 
Condorcet (1785) found a number of important results 
from the use of the binomial as a model of consensus. 
Assume that n is odd and n > 3 (although the results could 
be extended to even sets of agents). 
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Table 1 
Probability of Consensus Being Correct 
Assumes Equal Prior Odds 
n Q"'.10 P"'30 p-50 Q"'.70 p ... 90 
3 .028 .216 .500 .784 .972 
5 .009 .163 .500 .837 .991 
7 .003 .126 .500 .874 .997 
9 .001 .099 .500 .901 .999 
Result 1 
If p > .5 then P c > p. 
Result 2 
If p > .5 then Pc is monotonically increasing in n with a 
limit of 1. 
Result 3 
If p- .5 then Pc"' .5. 
Result 4 
If p < .5 then P c is monotonically decreasing in n with a 
limit of 0. 
Result 5 
If p < .5 then Pc < p. 
Result 1 indicates that if p > .5 then the probability that 
the consensus decision is correct, is greater than the 
probability that any single agent's decision is correct. In 
this situation, consensus is an appropriate surrogate for 
correctness. 
Result 2 suggests that, if p > .5 then the larger the number 
of agents, the higher that the probability of consensus is 
correct. This suggests that we have systems with larger 
number of agents in these situations. 
Result 3 finds that in this specific case nothing is gained 
by going from individual judgments to consensus 
judgments. 1f the probability of agents being correct is .5 
then the probability that consensus of agents is correct is 
also .5 . 
Result 4 indicates that, if p 
< 
.5 then the larger the 
number of agents, the lower that the probability of 
consensus is correct. In this situation, we would not gain 
from the use of more agents. 
Finally, Result 5 fmds that if p < .5 then the probability 
that the consensus decision is correct, is less than the 
probability that a single decision is correct. In this 
situation, consensus actually results in a lower probability 
of correctness. 
Thus, unless p > .5 consensus is not an appropriate 
management strategy of multiple agents. In addition, if p 
> .5 then the larger the set of agents the higher the 
probability that the consensus decision will be correct. 
3 EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC MODEL 
There were two primary assumptions in the model of the 
previous section: equal competence of agents and equal 
prior odds. This section extends the model of the previous 
section by relaxing these assumptions. 
3.1 RELAXATION OF THE EQUAL COMPETENCE 
ASSUMPTION 
It is reasonable to assume that different agents will have 
a different probability of pro viding the correct decision, 
particularly if they have either different lmowl edge or 
information. For example, human experts are often 
delineated as having different titles indicating gradation in 
expertise. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the agents 
come from a nwnber of different classes, where within 
each class, each agent is equally competent, yet there is an 
ordering of the competence of the different classes. 
Assume there are two different groups of agents, A and B 
(this assumption could be extended to more than two 
groups). It is assumed that within either of those two 
groups the quality of decisions is equal. Let Pi be the 
probability that an individual agent in group i is correct, 
i • A or B. Assume that 5 < PA < 1 and that Ps < PA· 
Let Pqi) be the probability that a consensus decision of 
group i is correct, i = A, B or, A and B (written as A,B). 
Margolis (1976) examined the model with this revised 
assumption and developed the following three results. 
Result 6 
If Pt, < .5 then p C(A,B) < p C(A)· 
Result 7 
If pb > .5, then there exists some cardinality of group B, 
referred to as a critical value B*, such that P CCA.B) 
> 
PqA)· 
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Result 8 
There exists some value Pb* < Pa• such that if Pt. > Pb* 
then p C(A,B) > p C(AY 
Result 6 indicates that if the value of Pb is low enough 
then it does not make sense to aggregate the two classes 
of agents in order to develop a consensus value. Result 7 
indicates that for Pt. of an appropriate level, if group B is 
large enough then it makes sense to integrate the agents 
into one lru:ge group of A and B, that will make the 
consensus decision. Result 8 indicates that if Pt. is large 
enough then group B should be integrated with group A, 
regardless of the size of group B. These results are 
surprising to a certain extent, since they indicate that, in 
some situations, lower quality agents should be integrated 
with higher quality agents for consensus judgments. 
Result 7 may lead to the requirement that group B be 
quite large, so as to be impractical in the case of multiple 
agent systems. If there are 30 agents in A, Pa "' .7 and 
Pb "' .51 then B* would be several hundred, and thus 
beyond the scope of typical multiple agent systems. 
Using results from Margolis (1976), the critical point 
nature of Result 8 can be exemplified as follows. If 
Pa"' .9 then Pb* =.82. If pa = .8 then Pb* =.70. If pa = .7 
then Pb* =.62. If Pa = .6 then Pb* =.55. 
These results can be extended. For example, the follow­
ing result indicates that if a subset of some set of agents 
is being used to develop a consensus judgment, then it is 
always better to add more of those same equal agents to 
the set of agents from which consensus is being devel­
oped. 
Result 9 
Let A* be a subset of A. PC(A) > PC(A*) for all A*, not 
equal to A. 
3.1.1 Normal Approximation 
The normal distribution can be used as an approximation 
to the binomial (Feller 1950). Thus, an alternative 
approach has been developed by Grofman (1978) and 
Grofman et al. (1983) that employs this result. Rather 
than multiple distinct sets of agents, they treat the set of 
agents as a single class, with competency normally 
distributed with a mean of p# and a variance of p#(l-p­
#)/n. In that case, the conclusions of the equal compe­
tence model will hold, with p# substituting for p. 
3.1.1 Poisson Approximation 
The poisson distribution also can be used to approximate 
the binomial (Feller [1950]), where the poisson is defmed 
as p(k;L) = e-L*L k/k!. In the same sense that the normal 
approximation to the binomial can be used to develop an 
alternative approach to the multiple classes, so can the 
poisson distribution. In the approximation of the poisson 
distribution, the parameter L is equal to n*(l-p). With L 
specified as n*(1-p) the same results as in section 2 hold. 
the only constraint on L is that L reflects the density of 
correct judgments in the group of agents. 
3.2 RELAXATION OF THE EQUAL PRIOR ODDS 
ASSUMPTION 
The model in section 2 also assumes that there are equal 
prior odds as to which of the alternatives is correct. 
However, in most decision making situations it is unlikely 
that the relevant states of nature are equally likely. 
Let Ps be the probability of the frrst state of the dichoto­
mous decision occurring. Let Ps• = (1 - p5), be the 
probability of the other state of nature. In the case of 
equal prior odds, Ps· = Ps = .5. Let pR be the probability 
of the agent making the correct decision in favor of the 
firSt alternative, given the prior odds for the state of nature 
S, assuming all agents are of equal competence. Let pR' 
be the probability of the agent choosing alternative R', 
making the correct decision, given the prior odds for the 
state of nature S'. and assuming equal competence. 
Table 2 
Probability of an Individual Decision Being Correct 
Given Unequal Prior Odds and 
Various Competencies When Prior Odds are Equal 
Competency (p) for Equal Prior Odds 
Prior 
Odds p=.lO p=.30 p=.50 p = .70 p:o.90 
.10 .012 .045 .100 .206 .500 
.20 .027 .(1.)7 .200 .368 .692 
.30 .045 .155 .300 .500 .794 
.40 .069 .222 .400 .609 .857 
.50 .wo· .300 .500 .700 .900 
.60 .143 .391 .600 .778 .931 
.70 .206 .500 .700 .845 .955 
.80 .308 .632 .800 .903 .973 
.90 .500 .794 .900 .955 .988 
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Using Bayes' theorem, we have PR. 
= (p*ps)/[(p*ps) 
+ 
(l-p)*Ps'l and PR.· = (p*Ps·)/[(p*ps.) + (1-p)*Psl Some 
example values are given in Table 2. 
3.2.1 Relationship Between p and p5, and PR 
There are a nwnber of relationships between p, Ps and PR· 
that can be developed, mapping the revised model into 
results obtained for the basic model, discussed in results 
1-5. 
Result 10 
If p + Ps > 1 then PR > .5. 
Proof of Result 10 
PR. = (p*ps) I [p*ps + (1-p)*(l-ps)l 
PR. = (p*p5) I [2p*p5 + (1 - p- Ps)J 
Since (1 - p - p5) is less than 0, PR > .5 
Result 11 
If p + Ps < 1 then PR < .5. 
Result 12 
If p + Ps = l then PR = .5. 
Proof of Result 12 
PR. = (p*ps) I [p*ps + (1-p)*(1-ps)l 
PR = (p*ps) I [2p*ps + (l -p -Ps)l 
Since p + Ps = 1, PR m .5 
How is the probability that a consensus judgment is 
correct impacted by the tmequal prior odds? Results l-5 
when combined with Results 10-12 provide us with the 
answer. We should use consensus only if p + Ps > 1. 
Thus, the quality of consensus judgments is a function of 
both those probabilities. 
3.2.2 Monotonicity Result for Revised Model 
In addition, we can establish a monotonicity result for PR· 
In particular, the following result indicates that PR is 
monotonically increasing as the prior odds increase. 
Result 13 PR is monotonically increasing in Ps· 
Proof 
Let Ps > Ps", then 
(p*pS) I [P*Ps + (1-p)*( 1-ps)} > 
(p*ps") I [p*pS" + (1-p)*(l-ps")] 
(p*pS) [2p*p5" + 1 -p -ps")] > 
(p*pS") [2p*p5 + 1 -p -Ps)l 
P*Ps -p*p*ps > p*pS" -p*p*pS" 
P*Ps -p*ps" > P*P*Ps -p*p*ps" 
Since Ps > p5", the inequality holds and PR. is monoto­
nically increasing in Ps. 
This can be a useful result. For example, we can make 
the following two statements. First, if we know p and 
have a conservative estimate of p5, such that P + Ps > 1, 
then we know that we should use consensus. We do not 
need to know Ps exactly. We may be able to use simply 
a lower bound. Second, if the prior odds are greater than 
.5, we know that the simplified equal odds model 
underestimates PR· 
Thus, in some cases the equal prior odds model helps 
bound the case where the prior odds are not equal. 
4 IMPLICATIONS AND IMPLEMENTA­
TION 
This section discusses some of the implications of the 
models in this paper and their implementation. 
4.1 IMPLICATIONS 
The basic model and its extensions, discussed in sections 
2 and 3, has a number of implications. First, the model 
indicates that the decision on whether or not consensus 
should be used to manage multiple agent systems, is a 
function of the sum of two parameters: p and Ps· 
Consensus should not be used indiscriminately. Second, 
in the consensus decision in the basic model, where p > 
.5, it is always beneficial for the use of a complete set of 
the best agents. · If all the top agents cannot participate 
then it is likely that the next highest class of agents should 
also be used in the development of the consensus 
judgment. Third, in the consensus model where p > .5 the 
results here suggests developing systems that have as large 
a set of agents as is feasible. At the margin, development 
costs can be traded off against the ability of the next agent 
to improve the probability that the consensus judgement 
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is correct. Fourth, the models imply some stopping criteria 
in the design of multiple agent systems. For example, we 
can see from table 1, that if there are equal prior odds and 
if p = .70 and we wish a Pc > .8 then we must use at 
least 5 agents to develop the consensus judgment. 
4.2 SOME IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS 
In order to implement the models in this paper, basic 
knowledge of the underlying parameters is required. The 
probabilities p and p8, are necessary to use the binomial 
model. The competency levels p could be obtained using 
at least two different approaches. 
First, a set of experiments could be generated to determine 
the probability of correct judgment (e.g., Libby 1976). 
Second, past performance data could be used. Prior odds 
of events, Ps could be obtained from experience. 
However, there is little in the literature about the quality 
of competence in even broad categories of events. This is 
an area for future research. 
5 SUMMARY AND EXTENSIONS 
This paper provides an analysis of a model of consensus 
for investigation of multiple agent problems with task 
centralization. There is an agent that solicits recommenda­
tions or plans from n independent agents. That centralized 
agent is then responsible for determining the consensus of 
the n agents. 
Consensus models have been used in a number of 
domains, including mission critical situations and air 
traffic control models. The consensus model is based on 
the binomial, but was extended to include multiple levels 
of competence and unequal prior odds. The results 
presented here summarized some classic results and 
presented new results. 
The basic model was limited to simple majorities as the 
means of the defmition of consensus. Alternative 
approaches used by other organizations may include a 
tw�thirds majority. These alternative defmitions of 
consensus could be accounted for in the model developed 
above. Further, rather than binomial models, multinomial 
models could be developed. Another approach is to use a 
Bayesian model of consensus. 
For example, O'Leary (1994) has studied the impact of 
using a Bayesian model, assuming changes in probabilities 
of individual agents on sequential judgment situations, 
based on sequential successes and failures of the agents to 
develop correct solutions. 
Further, the consensus approach could be compared to a 
complete decision analytic approach. In this setting, each 
agent would be viewed as a noisy sensor, mapping into a 
set of binary outputs. The problem would then be to 
choose different policies in order to maximize the 
expected utility, given a set of inputs. Voting policies, 
such as consensus, could provide efficient approximations 
to complete decision theoretic approaches. 
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